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Abstract: 
Researchers have proposed but not tested that early-stage adopters of ERP systems tend to be higher-performing
firms that adopt as a means of gaining or maintaining a competitive advantage. In contrast, they have proposed that
late-stage adopters are underperforming firms that experience institutional pressures and make adoption decisions
partly in response to those pressures and to try to improve performance and catch-up to industry leaders. In this
study, we examine the relationship between firm performance and ERP adoption. We found that late-stage adopters
tend to have lower financial performance relative to the overall market in the years leading up to adoption decisions as
compared to early-stage adopters that tended to outperform the market in years leading up to adoption decisions.
This finding demonstrates the relationship between firm performance and ERP adoption. We also found that, post-
adoption, the relative performance of late-stage adopters tends to improve more than early-stage adopters. This
finding suggests that following the actions of industry leaders and adopting ERP systems can have economic benefits
for underperforming firms. 
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1 Introduction 
Institutional theory posits that firms experience various types of pressures to adopt organizational 
structures and technologies including: 1) coercive pressure from outside influencers such as government 
entities or powerful customers; 2) normative pressure to follow best practices that other firms typically 
undertake; or (3) mimetic pressure to emulate the actions of highly successful firms (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, 1991).  
Theorists propose that institutional pressures are particularly strong when firms adopt complex structures 
that make systematic cost benefit analyses difficult and when firms are interconnected, which makes it 
easier for them to share information about technologies and structures. Institutional pressures are also 
strong among underperforming firms whose managers look to emulate more successful firms and industry 
norms as a means of legitimizing their decisions (Hawley, Boland, & Boland, 1965; Tuttle & Dillard, 2007; 
Ugrin, 2009). Research has found linkages between the primary facets of institutional theory and systems 
adoption decisions (Teo, Wei, & Benbasat, 2003) and have provided evidence to suggest that the 
interconnectedness between firms indeed amplifies institutional pressures (e.g., Mezias & Scarselletta, 
1994). Research also shown that firms considering complex structures, such as enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) systems, are more susceptible to institutional pressures (Ugrin, 2009). The literature has 
not; however, provided evidence of the relationship between firm performance and institutional theory.  
Classical institutional theorists have also argued that adopting systems because of institutional pressures 
rather than systematic analyses can be problematic for firms because they may adopt systems that do not 
fit their organizations, which may, in turn, be one reason that systems such as ERP systems sometimes 
fail to provide expected returns (Hong & Kim, 2002). If ERP systems do not fit, adoption would ultimately 
hurt firm performance post-adoption, and their underperformance would continue and perhaps become 
even greater (Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). However, we find that unlikely when considering system 
adoption through a neo-institutional lens (Tuttle & Dillard, 2007). From that perspective, underperforming 
firms would not blindly follow the lead of high performers—they would wait and see if technologies 
previously adopted by high-performing firms provide the expected benefits and adopt similar technologies 
if they do. By following the lead of early adopters, late-stage adopters learn valuable insights and avoid 
costs associated with research, development, and analyses while gaining the same benefits as early 
adopters who have endured such costs. Thus, late-stage adopters may ultimately gain more from ERP 
adoption. We do not know about any ERP study that has shown such an effect. However, other 
literatures, such as the diffusion of innovations literature (Rogers, 1983) and the literature on first mover 
advantages and disadvantages (Porter, 1985), recognize the idea that early-stage adopters may face a 
disadvantage because they incur exploration and learning costs while late-stage adopters do not.  
In this paper, we examine if late-stage adopters tend to be underperforming firms and see if their 
performance improves post-adoption. We explore the first objective by examining the relationship between 
the performance of firms that have adopted ERP systems and the timing of their adoption. Consistent with 
propositions that Rumelt (1974), Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Young, Charns, and Shortell (2001) have 
made, we propose that early-stage adopters tend to be higher-performing firms who are more likely to 
adopt by way of more detailed systematic analyses to expand their competitive advantage and that late-
stage adopters tend to be lower-performing firms who are less likely to adopt due to detailed systematic 
analyses and, thus, mimic or follow the norms set by the higher-performing firms to legitimize their actions 
and to catch-up to leading firms. We empirically demonstrate the relationship between firm performance 
and stage of adoption by examining the relative performance of early and late-stage adopters of ERP 
systems using data from public reporting companies that adopted ERP systems between 1994 and 2001. 
We explore the second objective by testing if late-stage adopters of ERP systems obtain a benefit and see 
their performance improve relative to the market after following the lead of successful firms. We 
demonstrate that relationship empirically by testing our sample of adopting firms and measuring if the 
abnormal market returns of the late-stage adopters improve or decline post-adoption relative to early-
stage adopters.  
We found that late-stage adopters tend to have significantly lower abnormal market returns versus early-
stage adopters leading up to the implementation decision. This pattern is consistent with our proposition 
that late-stage adopters tend to be underperforming firms. We also found that, post-adoption, late-stage 
adopters’ abnormal market returns improve relative to early-stage adopters, which suggests they benefit 
from their adoption decision and make progress towards catching up.  
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These findings contribute to the ERP literature by moving beyond simplistically explaining that firms 
perform thorough cost-benefit analyses and make adoption decisions based solely on those analyses 
when adopting ERP systems. We also contribute to the institutional theory literature by: 1) examining a 
previously untested condition that would theoretically amplify institutional pressures and firm performance 
and 2) showing that adopting technologies at later stages in response to institutional pressures can be 
more than a legitimatizing action but an economically advantageous one. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature on ERP adoption, 
institutional theory, and ERP adoption from an institutional theory perspective. Based on that review, we 
formulate hypotheses. In Section 3, we discuss the paper’s methodology and data sample and, in Section 
4, present the results. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss our study’s limitations and implications and 
conclude the paper. 
2 Background 
In a competitive environment practical use of technology can positively position firms in their industry. An 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) system is one such technology that can give firms a competitive 
advantage by altering processes in the organizational value stream (Hayes, Hunton, & Reck, 2001; Markus 
& Tanis, 2000). ERP systems evolved in the 1990s from manufacturing resource planning (MRPII) systems 
and materials requirements planning (MRP) systems (Umble, Haft, & Umble, 2003). They consolidate all of 
the back-office information processing requirements of a typical business into one integrated system, which 
includes accounting/finance, human resources, operations, supply chain, and customer information 
(Davenport, 1998). This common system design allows firms to capture information once and then share it 
across functional areas, which enables “information congruence” (O’Leary, 2002). Although the potential 
benefits of ERP systems are well accepted, the economic returns for ERP adopters have been inconsistent 
(Markus & Tanis, 2000; Nicolaou, 2004; Nicolaou & Bhattacharya, 2006; Morris, 2011).  
The literature on ERP adoption tends to assume that managers adopt ERP systems only after performing 
systematic cost/benefit analyses aimed at quantifying the operational efficiencies that their firm can obtain 
through the ERP system. For instance, in reviewing ERP research, Grabski, Leech, and Schmidt (2011, p. 
38) state that “ERP system adoption is motivated by management’s need for timely access to consistent 
information across the diverse functional areas of a company”. However, some information systems 
researchers have offered a different perspective using institutional theory as a lens to investigate the 
adoption of ERP and other information systems (Orlikowski & Barley, 2001; Fichman, 2004; Teo et al., 
2003; Jeyariaj, Charles, Balser, & Griggs, 2004; Ugrin, 2009; Lyytinen, Newman, & Al-Muharfi, 2009).  
Orlikowski and Barley (2001, p. 25) found that the systems literature had a narrow focus and had yet to 
“make much use of more recent developments in organization theory that include themes of 
institutionalization, globalization, entrepreneurship, and post-modernity”. They go on to state that “an 
institutional perspective would offer IT researchers a vantage point for conceptualizing the digital economy 
as an emergent, evolving, embedded, fragmented, and provisional social production that is shaped as 
much by cultural and structural forces as by technical and economic ones”. Likewise, Fichman (2004, p. 
325) suggests that a failing in systems research is that the “dominant paradigm is that organizations each 
make independent assessment of the innovation and decide whether and when to adopt based on the 
inherent merits of the technology (e.g., potential to improve the organization versus the cost to adopt)”. As 
a heed to those calls, other researchers have used institutional theory to depict how some firms look 
outside their own firms for technologies to adopt rather than systematically analyzing internal information 
system needs (Teo et al., 2003). Research has shown the effect of institutional pressures to be 
particularly strong on firms that adopt ERP systems due ERP systems’ high complexity and because it is 
difficult to systematically assess the potential costs and benefits of adopting them (Ugrin, 2009).  
2.1 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory describes the effects of social pressures on organizational decisions and includes three 
facets that influence how individuals formulate organizational decisions after considering outside influences 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). The three facets of institutional theory are: 1) compliance to coercive 
pressures, 2) conformity to established norms, and 3) mimicry of perceived legitimate organizations.  
The coercive facet of institutional theory depicts how firms comply with powerful entities, such as 
governments or powerful customers. It describes how firms can feel obligated to adopt technologies and 
structures due to real or perceived pressures that powerful entities place on them. Compliance with 
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coercive pressures is less “voluntary” than the other two facets (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 1991). For 
example, some firms may have adopted ERP systems prior to the year 2000 to avoid so-called Y2K 
problems1 (DePrince & Ford, 1998). Those firms may have felt compelled to adopt to avoid the risk of 
damaging the firm or going out of business if the dire predictions came true. Research has shown the 
coercive facet of institutional theory to influence how firms are structured (Fligstein, 1985), and, when 
evaluated in the context of ERP adoption, research has conjectured it to be a significant driver of ERP 
adoption in firms (Lyytinen et al., 2009).  
Conformity to established norms depicts how organizations go along with industry norms and standards. 
Conformity tends to occur more easily in industries because interaction between firms allows them to 
exchange ideas (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, & Sahlin, 2008). Teo et al. (2003, p. 24) state: “A focal 
organization with direct or indirect ties to other organizations that have adopted an innovation is able to 
learn about that innovation and its associated benefits and costs, and is likely to behave similarly”. Thus, 
involvement in professional, trade, or other business organizations amplifies normative pressure (Teo et 
al., 2003; Ugrin, 2009). In another context (accounting), Mezias and Scarselletta (1994) attributed 
consensus building among the Financial Accounting Standards Board members to conformity. They found 
that, when the task force members had a common background, they reached consensus more quickly and 
with less debate. In the context of ERP, Ugrin (2009) found that managers were more likely to indicate 
they would adopt an ERP system when ERP systems had already been adopted by their firms’ suppliers 
and customers.  
The mimetic facet of institutional theory depicts how underperforming firms tend to follow the lead—or 
mimic—firms that are performing well. Industry leaders tend to be innovators that focus on developing 
new ways to maintain their advantage and make decisions through cost-benefit analyses aimed at 
improving operational and organizational effectiveness (Rumelt, 1974; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Tuttle & 
Dillard, 2007). As industry leaders, early-stage adopters also have the resources to invest in new 
technologies. Underperformers lack resources to develop technologies on their own and also feel 
pressured to legitimize their decisions by mimicking industry leaders or following the norms in their 
industry. Mimicry can be advantageous as mimicking firms that use a “wait-and-see-what-happens–at-
other-firms” approach to management can avoid the costs and pitfalls of developing and implementing 
new technologies on their own. Researchers have used mimicry to explain many organizational decisions 
such as the adoption of different organizational structures (Fligstein, 1985) and the adoption of 
governmental policies (Radaelli, 2000). In Ugrin’s (2009) study, managers were more likely to indicate 
they would adopt an ERP system if they perceived that successful competitors had already done so.  
From a classical perspective, both mimicry and conformity to norms are rooted in insecurity, risk, and 
uncertainty. Firms attempt to eliminate these factors by imitating other organizations they perceive to be 
successful or conforming to the practices undertaken by other firms in their industry. Mimicry and 
conformity ease the insecurity caused by ambiguity and give decision makers a feeling of assurance that 
they are making good decisions; the decision makers expect that important constituents will evaluate their 
decisions favorably regardless of the eventual outcome (Donaldson, 1995). For example, even if the result 
of a decision to adopt an ERP system goes bad or the performance of an underperforming firm that elects 
to adopt an ERP system does not improve, an organization will find it easier to justify the decision itself if it 
follows the actions of highly successful firms or industry norms. This type of action—following the behavior 
of industry leaders—brings legitimacy to underperforming managers’ decisions, which is part of the 
institutional process that Tuttle and Dillard (2007, p. 390) describe:  
As one or more entities or groups gain advantage through whatever means and begin to 
accumulate resources and power, the organizational field stratifies and institutional legitimacy 
rises to force. ….For those who are already in force, their modes of behavior (processes and 
procedures) become routine, facilitating stability. As these routine behaviors decouple from 
competitive measures, they are more likely to become ceremonial and political influences. For 
those who are not in force, forces within the organizational field create pressure to adopt 
behaviors similar to those of “successful” entities. 
                                                     
1 Prior to the year 2000, many software applications used only a two digit field to represent the year. A concern developed that, when 
the century changed, many applications that used date functions would experience problems. Many felt that the problems could even 
crash entire systems as date ranges would be confused because the year 00, for instance, would be considered earlier than the year 
99. 
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Initially, classical institutional theorists intended to challenge the rational/functionalist perspective on 
management by “depicting organizations as irrational and their managers as duplicitous” (Donaldson, 
1995, p. 80). From this point of view, underperforming firms should quickly embrace practices and 
technologies implemented by leading firms without even waiting to evaluate the effects of those practices 
and technologies. Thus, adopting organizational mechanisms becomes a social process in which 
innovation is replaced by management’s attempt to justify their organization’s actions by adopting 
mechanisms that have been adopted by leading firms. The more contemporary point of view is that late-
stage adopters observe the actions of innovative firms that differentiate themselves through creative using 
new technologies and structures, and, if those implementation decisions are successful, the late-stage 
adopters follow suit. Late-stage adopters observe and process outcome information rather than perform a 
systematic analysis conducted in an orderly fashion that evaluates each component of the system, the 
processes the new system impacts, and the potential savings the new system will bring through process 
improvements (e.g., Tuttle & Dillard, 2007). Thus, both innovation and pressures to comply with industry 
practices and norms that have developed through initial success guide the late-stage adoption of 
technologies and structures.  
As a final point, researchers have traditionally suggested that increased homogeneity among firms 
evidences institutional theory. In industries, institutional pressures result in increased homogeneity, and, 
as organizations become increasingly homogeneous, that pressure amplifies, which results in even 
greater homogeneity (Hawley et al., 1965). How firms in an industry adopt technologies evolves over time 
from a state in which firms independently evaluate technologies and innovation to a state of homogeneity 
in which firms identify best practices in using technologies, which leads to most firms adopting those 
technologies.  
2.2 Institutional Theory and ERP Adoption: Existing Literature, Missing Elements 
and Hypotheses 
In the systems-adoption literature, Teo et al. (2003) found that perceived institutional pressures influenced 
managers’ intent to adopt information systems (financial electronic data interchange), and Ugrin (2009) 
extended that research by examining the effects of institutional pressures on managers’ intent to adopt 
ERP systems specifically. Ugrin (2009) also tested the moderating effects of managers’ perceptions of the 
complexity of the system and their perceptions that the ERP system will integrate firms up and down the 
supply chain. Ugrin (2009) found that ERP adoption decisions are particularly susceptible to institutional 
pressures because of the difficulty in quantifying the benefits of an ERP system due to the system’s size 
and complexity. Managers were more likely to mimic when they perceived that the ERP system was 
complex and a systematic cost-benefit analysis would be hard to perform. They were also more likely to 
be influenced by normative pressures when they perceived that the system would integrate firms. Taken 
as a whole, these findings suggest that firms make ERP adoption decisions through both functional 
(integration up and down the supply chain that would seemingly reduce cost) and non-functional 
processes (mimicking other firms because the cost-benefit of ERP is hard to evaluate). 
In another study, Lyytinen et al. (2009) used an “ethnographic” approach to evaluate the factors that 
influenced a Saudi steel company’s decision to adopt an ERP system. They interviewed 63 people 
involved in designing and implementing the system. Their findings suggest that the company first adopted 
the ERP system because its previous system lacked future support (a coercive pressure). Other pressures 
from its observing its competitors and governmental pressure to modernize also influenced its ultimate 
decision to implement an ERP system and how it did so.  
The studies cited in the previous two paragraphs evidence the linkages between institutional pressures 
and ERP adoption decisions and examine several moderating factors that amplify institutional pressures. 
However, research has yet to examine empirical data to test assertions made by institutional theorists that 
poor-performing firms tend to be late-stage adopters of technologies and structures for reasons such as 
lack of resources and mounting pressure (Hawley et al. 1965). Poor-performing firms’ managers have a 
greater tendency to look outside their firm for solutions and legitimate courses of action (Rumelt, 1974; 
Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Young et al., 2001). Firms perceive the most legitimate courses of action as the 
actions that other firms have successfully taken (Ugrin, 2009).  
An historical look at ERP adoption from early to later stages would offer evidence to support the assertion 
that institutional pressures, technology adoption, and firm performance interact. To provide evidence of 
the relationships between firm performance, stage of adoption, and institutional pressure, we propose that 
archival data will show that the financial performance of late-stage ERP adopters will be worse than that of 
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early-stage adopters. We expect to see a pattern of adoption in which more successful firms lead the way 
and underperformers follow. We propose that significant differences in performance for firms in the two 
stages and a larger number of poor performers in the later years will substantiate our proposition. We 
make the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Late-stage ERP adopters are more likely to underperform relative to early-stage 
ERP adopters.  
Our second hypothesis centers on the ultimate outcomes for late-stage adopters. The neo-institutional 
perspective suggests that late-stage adopters of technologies adopt technologies as a legitimizing action 
and adopt technologies that others have successfully implemented (Tuttle & Dillard, 2007). Late-stage 
adopters may not perform a detailed and systematic analysis of the costs and benefits of implementing an 
ERP system, but they may evaluate the success of others who have implemented ERP instead. Thus, 
late-stage adopters can avoid the costs associated with systematic analyses but can gain the benefits 
from ERP adoption. As such, late-stage adopters may see their relative performance to early-stage 
adopters improve as early-stage adopters expend money and resources on analyzing and researching 
new technologies such as ERP and late-stage adopters do not—late-stage adopters just implement 
systems that have been beneficial to others without expending a large amount of resources on the front 
end.  
Note that ERP systems do not fit all firms because not all firms are alike, but they tend to have positive 
effects on firm performance in general and, thus, we conjecture they will positively benefit late-stage 
adopters and improve their abnormal market returns. Note also that late-stage adopters’ abnormal returns 
may improve relative to early-stage adopters because they have more to gain by default as their past poor 
performance leaves them more room for improvement. However, as we illustrate above, late-stage 
adopters can gain on early-stage adopters by foregoing the costs of detailed research and analysis while 
enjoying the benefits. We expect to see the abnormal market returns for late-stage adopters to improve 
relative to early-stage adopters. 
Hypothesis 2: The performance of late-stage ERP adopters improves more than the performance 
of early-stage adopters post-adoption.  
3 Methodology and Data Sample 
3.1 Methodology 
Although one can measure firm performance in several different ways, prior research (mainly in 
accounting and finance) has used the capital markets pricing of equity as a proxy for the intrinsic value of 
a firm (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Ball & Brown, 1968; Ohlson, 1995; Feltham & Ohlson, 1995). The 
efficient market hypothesis holds that the price of a security is an accurate estimate of the securities true 
value made by the market.  The estimate fully reflects all information that is publicly available (Eakins, 
2002). As firms’ performance changes, the value of their stock changes to reflect the market’s estimate of 
their value: well- performing firms experience increases in stock price, and poor-performing firms 
experience decreases. Measuring the change in this price is one way to assess a firm’s performance. A 
better measure is the total returns that shareholders experience based on the change in price (capital 
appreciation) and dividends earned over a period of time. To test our hypotheses, we examine monthly 
returns for ERP adopters prior to the ERP implementation decision using the following abnormal returns 
model adapted from Ang and Zhang (2004): 
ABRETit = Rit – BRit (1) 
Where ABRETit is the abnormal return for firm i in period t, Rit is the total return for firm i in period t, and 
BRit is the benchmark return for firm i in period t. We obtained the data to calculate returns for each firm 
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices’ (CRSP) monthly database.  Our calculation for returns 
is based on the change in market price for the firm’s stock during the holding period adjusted for stock 
splits and dividend payments. Benchmark returns are based on the CRSP’s value weighted index for all 
firms in the database during the corresponding monthly periods. Therefore, firms with positive abnormal 
returns have performed above the benchmark and those with negative abnormal returns have performed 
below it. Since we computed abnormal returns on a relative basis compared to all other returns during the 
same month, our calculation controls for other macro-economic factors that could affect stock price. 
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Based on our hypothesis, we would expect late-stage adopters of ERP systems to have lower abnormal 
returns than early-stage adopters.  
To measure the difference in performance between early-stage adopters and late-stage adopters, we 
compare the frequency of positive and negative abnormal returns over the four-year period leading up to 
the implementation decision. We also use the following ordinary least squares regression model to 
measure the average abnormal returns during the same period: 
ABRETit =  + 1Lateit + 2MCapit +  (2) 
Where ABRETit is the abnormal return for firm i in period t. Lateit is a dichotomous variable equal to (1) for 
late-stage adopters and (0) for early-stage adopters, MCapit is the natural log of the market capitalization 
for firm i in period t, and  is the error term. We use market capitalization to control for firm size because 
prior research has indicated that size may have an impact on firm performance (Hayes et al. 2001). 
To test our second hypothesis, we expand the OLS model to include an indicator variable to identify pre- 
and post-ERP implementation returns and an interaction variable as follows: 
ABRETit =  + 1Lateit + 2Postit + 3Late*Postit + 4MCapit +  (3) 
Where ABRETit, Lateit, and MCapit are as described in Equation 2 above, and Postit is a dichotomously 
coded variable equal to 1 for post-ERP implementation and 0 for pre-ERP implementation and Late*Postit 
is an interaction variable based on Late x Post. The interaction variable allows one to measure the impact 
of returns for late-stage adopters, post-ERP implementation relative to early-stage adopters. A positive 
coefficient would indicate that late-stage adopters improved relative to early-stage adopters. A negative 
coefficient would indicate that early-stage adopters improved relative to late-stage adopters. 
3.2 Data Sample 
Table 1 summarizes our data sample, which comprises 137 firms from 36 industries that decided to 
implement ERP systems between 1994 and 2001. Gartner Group first coined the term ERP in 1990 to 
describe MRP and MRPII systems that added financial and other business functions (Singleton, 2013). 
However, firms did not significantly begin to implement these systems until the mid-1990s. Sales by SAP, 
the largest vendor of ERP software, grew from US$500 million in 1992 to US$3.3 billion in 1997 
(Davenport, 1998). We consider implementers of this technology during this time period as early-stage 
adopters. Our sample begins with the 91 ERP implementation announcements made between 1994 and 
1998 from Hayes et al. (2001)2. Since we are interested in the period of time leading up to when a firm 
made the decision to implement an ERP system and not necessarily when they actually implemented it, 
we consider the announcement date as the event date for this study. We exclude 15 of these firms 
because they had less than 24 months of return data available in CRSP prior to the implementation 
decision. We believe that one needs a minimum of 24 months of return data to establish the financial 
performance of firms prior to implementing ERP systems3. We extended the initial sample by searching 
available newswire services using the Lexis-Nexis service for years after 1998 and key phrases such as 
“ERP”, “enterprise resource planning”, and “enterprise systems”. As a result, we found an additional 61 
firm announcements between 1998 and 2001 for firms that had implemented ERP systems, which yielded 
a total of 137 firms for which the CRSP database had return data for at least 24 months prior to the ERP 
implementation decision. 
To test our second hypothesis, we collected return data from the CRSP database for each of our sample 
firms for an additional 48 months following implementation. Although doing so results in different calendar 
periods for each firm, by using abnormal returns, which measure performance relative to the rest of the 
market, we control for other economic influences that may be different in each of the calendar periods. As 
we discuss above, we consider the year of the announcement as the year for implementing the system 
and exclude it from both the pre- and post-implementation data. We exclude the implementation year 
because we believe that data can be distorted during that period. Although it is difficult to know for sure 
how long each firm takes to implement the system and how much distortion could occur during the 
process, we use one year, which is consistent with Nicolaou (2004) who documents an average 
implementation of 9.92 months. Therefore, our overall sample contains the available monthly returns for 
up to 48 months before and 48 months after the implementation year for each firm. Our sample shows a 
                                                     
2 We thank David C. Hayes and Jacqueline L. Reck for providing this list of firms. 
3 Sensitivity analysis indicates our resulting conclusions would not be effected by inclusion of firms with less than 24 months of data. 
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large increase in the number of ERP adopters in 1998—from 20 and 24 in 1996 and 1997 to 44 in 1998. 
We believe many firms adopted ERP systems during the run up to the year 2000 in part to update 
systems because of the so-called Y2K issue discussed earlier. These late-stage adopters would not only 
be in a position to mimic the early adopters but also could have experienced coercive pressure to adopt 
for non-strategic reasons (i.e., Y2K compliance). Therefore, we define firms that implemented ERP 
systems during the first four years of our sample from 1994 to 1997 as “early-stage adopters” and those 
during the last four years from 1998 to 2001 as “late-stage adopters”. We also note that the contemporary 
neo-institutional perspective states that late-stage adopters wait and observe early-stage adopters (Tuttle 
& Dillard, 2007). Thus, there would be less institutional pressure throughout 1994-1997 as compared to 
1998-2001 when those late-stage adopters had more opportunity to observe the early-stage adopters. Our 
sample includes 54 firms identified as early-stage adopters and 83 firms identified as late-stage adopters. 
We did not extend the sample beyond the initial eight years because we wanted to keep the time periods 
somewhat proportional (i.e., four years of early and four years of late-stage adopters). We were also 
concerned that the results beyond 2001 may be impacted by other factors such as improvements in the 
underlying technology and consolidation of ERP firms. 
Because of the early relationship of ERP systems with the manufacturing sector, we also posit that the 
anticipated relationship will be most pronounced in manufacturing firms. We base this position on Burt 
(1982), who theorizes that inter-organizational relationships and frequent interaction between firms allow 
them to learn about each other’s practices, strategies, and technologies and the associated outcomes, 
which results in increased pressure to act alike. Interconnectedness and interaction between firms in 
industrial sectors amplify mimicry (Donaldson, 1995; Ugrin, 2009). Managers of lower-performing firms will 
first look towards the actions of higher-performing firms in their industry for strategies. The mutual 
interaction and increased information exchange in an industry should result in increased mimetic 
pressures, particularly on late-stage adopters. Consistent with this tenet, we propose that the 
performance/stage relationship will be more pronounced among firms in the same type of industry. 
Specifically, because ERP systems have their origins in the manufacturing sector, we expect that 
relationship to be more pronounced in that industry than in other industries. In supplemental tests, we 
divided our sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing sub-samples. We used the Standard 
Industrial Codes (SICCD) from the CRSP database to make this split: we assigned all firms with SIC 
codes between 2000 and 3999 to the manufacturing category and all others to the non-manufacturing 
category. Our sample included 87 manufacturing and 50 non-manufacturing firms: 31 manufacturing firms 
were early adopters and 56 were late adopters, and 23 non-manufacturing firms were early adopters and 
27 were late adopters. 
Table 1. ERP Firms by Two-digit SIC Code and Implementation Decision Year 
 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 Total 
13: Oil and gas extraction   1 2 3  1  7 
20 (Mfg): Food and kindred products   1  3 1   5 
23 (Mfg): Apparel     1  1   2 
24 (Mfg): Lumber & wood products     1    1 
25 (Mfg): Furniture & fixtures     2  1  3 
26 (Mfg): Paper & allied products   1  1 1 1 1 5 
27 (Mfg): Printing & publishing 1  1  1 1   4 
28 (Mfg): Chemicals  1 2 1 1 2 1 2 10 
29 (Mfg): Petroleum refining  1  1 3    5 
30 (Mfg): Rubber & misc. plastic  1   1    2 
33 (Mfg): Primary metal industries   2  2  1  5 
34 (Mfg): Fabricated metal products 1 1 1 1     4 
35 (Mfg): Ind. & com. machinery 1 1  1 8 3 3 2 18 
36 (Mfg): Electronic & elect. equip.   3 3 4 1 1 1 13 
37 (Mfg): Transportation equipment  1  1  1 1  5 
38 (Mfg): Measuring & control instr.  1 2  2 1   6 
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Table 1. ERP Firms by Two-digit SIC Code and Implementation Decision Year 
39 (Mfg): Misc. manufacturing      1    1 
42: Motor freight transportation     1    1 
45: Transportation by air    1 2    3 
48: Communications   2  1    3 
49: Electric, gas & sanitary services    2     2 
50: Wholesale: durable goods    1 2  2  5 
51: Wholesale: non-durable goods   2  1  1  4 
52: Retail: hardware stores     1    1 
54: Retail: food stores    1     1 
58: Retail: restaurants    1     1 
59: Retail: miscellaneous    1  1   2 
60: Commercial banking    1     1 
61: Consumer lending     1    1 
63: Life insurance carriers    2     2 
65: Real estate agents & brokers     1    1 
67: Holding & other investment 1  1 1   1  4 
73: Automotive repair & service    2 1 1 2  6 
80: Health services     1    1 
82: Higher education       1  1 
87: Engineering, accounting & other        1 1 
Totals 4 7 19 24 45 14 17 7 137 
4 Empirical Results 
Table 2 lists early-stage adopters along with their average abnormal return over the 48 months leading up 
to their decision to implement an ERP system4. Thirty-three of the early-stage adopters had positive 
abnormal returns and 21 had negative abnormal returns. Table 3 lists the same information for the late-
stage adopters. Thirty-one had positive abnormal returns and 52 with negative abnormal returns. 
Table 2. Early-stage Adopters of ERP Average Abnormal Returns 
Name ABRET Name ABRET
Rainforest Cafe Inc 0.0713 Allergan Inc 0.0019 
Jabil Circuit Inc 0.0664 Alcan Inc 0.0015 
Cisco Systems Inc 0.0481 Chevron Corp 0.0013 
Employee Solutions Inc 0.0469 Daw Technologies Inc 0.0011 
Triquint Semiconductor 0.0429 Donnelley (R R) & Sons 0.0007 
Qualcomm Inc 0.0351 Toyota Motor Corp 0.0002 
Kla-Tencor Corp 0.0349 Toys R Us Inc -0.0007 
Silicon Graphics Inc 0.0326 Snap-On Inc -0.0014 
Teradyne Inc 0.0256 Sonoco Products Co -0.0014 
Plantronics Inc 0.0223 Liz Claiborne Inc -0.0019 
Lsi Logic Corp 0.0212 Honeywell Inc -0.0034 
                                                     
4 In some cases, 48 months of returns were not available, in which case we used the number of months of data that were available 
provided there was at least 24 months. 
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Table 2. Early-stage Adopters of ERP Average Abnormal Returns 
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals 0.0175 Schlumberger Ltd -0.0046 
Cabletron Systems Inc 0.0174 Ihop Corp -0.0048 
Glenayre Technologies Inc 0.0162 Gte Corp -0.0053 
Tektronix Inc 0.0153 Lg&E Energy Corp -0.0060 
Gerber Scientific Inc 0.0136 Watts Water Techn Inc -0.0063 
Furon Co 0.0110 Cooper Cameron Corp -0.0063 
Equifax Inc 0.0101 Apache Corp -0.0078 
Valspar Corp 0.0098 Church & Dwight Inc -0.0083 
Movado Group Inc 0.0098 Southwest Airlines -0.0087 
Walgreen Co 0.0091 Amerada Hess Corp -0.0107 
Dana Corp 0.0066 Perrigo Co -0.0110 
Media General 0.0052 P E C O Energy Co -0.0150 
Allied Chemical & Dye Corp 0.0036 Geneva Steel -0.0156 
Hibernia Corp 0.0034 Torch Energy Rel Trust -0.0189 
Dole Food Co Inc 0.0028 Green Mountain Coffee -0.0202 
General Binding Corp 0.0023 Penn Traffic Co -0.0297 
ABRET = Average monthly abnormal returns prior to ERP implementation decision based on at least 24 and up to 48 monthly 
returns using the following formula: 
ABRETit = Rit – BRit,
         
 
where Rit is the return for firm i in period t, BRit is the benchmark return for firm i in period t, and ABRETit is the abnormal return for 
firm i in period t. 
 
Table 3. Late-stage Adopters of ERP Average Abnormal Returns 
Name ABRET Name ABRET
Network Appliance Inc 0.0877 Ogden Corp -0.0056 
Dell Inc 0.0689 Kerr-Mcgee Corp -0.0057 
Jds Uniphase Corp 0.0654 Hormel Foods Corp -0.0060 
Xeta Technologies Inc 0.0460 Sierra Health Services -0.0080 
Wind River Systems Inc 0.0408 Aviall Inc -0.0095 
American Technical Ceramics 0.0357 Global Industrial Tech Inc -0.0097 
Pemco Aviation Group Inc 0.0282 Department 56 Inc  -0.0098 
Artesyn Technologies Inc 0.0262 Adflex Solutions Inc -0.0109 
Capital One Finl Corp 0.0223 Union Carbide Corp -0.0111 
Riverside Group Inc 0.0215 Boeing Co -0.0116 
Technitrol Inc 0.0186 Bassett Furniture Inds -0.0117 
Miller (Herman) Inc 0.0177 Auspex Systems Inc -0.0123 
Bio-Logic Systems Corp 0.0140 Credence Systems Corp -0.0125 
Astec Industries Inc 0.0137 Tennant Co -0.0126 
Tosco Corp 0.0111 Standard Register Co -0.0128 
Genrad Inc 0.0107 Burlington Resources Inc -0.0130 
Hershey Co 0.0098 Neighborcare Inc -0.0131 
Nice Systems Ltd 0.0094 Officemax Inc -0.0131 
Intertape Polymer Group 0.0075 Abitibi Consolidated Inc -0.0134 
Varco International Inc 0.0074 Gundle/Slt Environmental -0.0157 
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Table 3. Late-stage Adopters of ERP Average Abnormal Returns 
Elcor Chemical Corp 0.0071 Overland Storage Inc -0.0160 
Sara Lee Corp 0.0070 Fsi Intl Inc -0.0161 
Adept Technology Inc 0.0066 Lawson Products -0.0161 
Amx Corp 0.0065 Ferrellgas Partners -0.0162 
Mitel Corp 0.0061 Cummins Inc -0.0166 
Skywest Inc 0.0050 Glatfelter -0.0173 
Home Depot Inc 0.0035 Alamo Group Inc -0.0181 
Pitney Bowes Inc 0.0029 Network Equipment Tech -0.0208 
Halliburton Co 0.0028 Frozen Food Express Inds -0.0217 
Sprint Corp 0.0024 Moore Corp Ltd -0.0230 
Bellsouth Corp 0.0019 Schulman, Inc -0.0234 
Hei Inc -0.0004 Louisiana-Pacific Corp -0.0241 
Lancaster Colony Corp -0.0016 Cybex International Inc -0.0257 
Baker (Michael) Corp -0.0016 Stewart & Stevenson Svcs -0.0275 
Evans & Sutherland Cmp -0.0020 Titanium Metals Corp -0.0284 
Biogen Idec Inc -0.0027 Riverside Group Inc -0.0314 
Rohm And Haas Co -0.0035 Elkcorp -0.0314 
Vf Corp -0.0038 Business Resource Group -0.0372 
Ametek Inc -0.0039 Jlm Industries Inc -0.0404 
Stepan Co -0.0040 Steelcase Inc -0.0509 
Eastman Chemical Co -0.0045 Nu-Kote Hldg Inc -0.0522 
Posco -0.0045   
ABRET = Average monthly abnormal returns prior to ERP implementation based on at least 24 and up to 48 monthly returns using 
the following formula: 
ABRETit = Rit – BRit,
         
 
where Rit is the return for firm i in period t, BRit is the benchmark return for firm i in period t, and ABRETit is the abnormal return for 
firm i in period t. 
Figure 1 graphically displays the frequency of positive and negative abnormal returns by implementation-
decision year. Note that, in the first four years (early-stage adopters), the frequency of positive returns 
was equal to or greater than the number of negative returns, whereas, in the last four years (late-stage 
adopters), the frequency of negative returns exceeded the positive returns. One can also see by 
examining the breakdown between manufacturing and non-manufacturing that the results were 
particularly strong in the manufacturing industry. 
Table 4 summarizes the frequencies in two ways: panel A shows the frequency of positive and negative 
average abnormal returns for each firm over the four years leading up to the implementation decision, and 
panel B shows the frequency of monthly returns over the same period. The chi-square test in both panels 
shows that, for the overall sample of all firms, the differences were highly significant at the p = 0.01 level, 
with late-stage adopters having more negative abnormal returns. The sub-sample for manufacturing firms 
confirms that the overall results were driven by this segment as we anticipated. 
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Table 4. Frequency of Average Monthly Abnormal Returns Prior to ERP Implementation Decision
 All firms Manufacturing firms Non-manufacturing
 Early Late Total Early Late Total Early Late Total
Panel A: firm average abnormal returns 
ABRET <= 0          
Frequency 21 52 73 9 37 46 12 15 27 
Percent 15% 38% 53% 10% 43% 53% 24% 30% 54% 
ABRET > 0          
Frequency 33 31 64 22 19 41 11 12 23 
Percent 24% 23% 47% 25% 22% 47% 22% 24% 46% 
TOTALS          
Frequency 54 83 137 31 56 87 23 27 50 
Percent 39% 61% 100% 35% 65% 100.0 46% 54% 100%
          
Chi-square: Value  7.4207   10.986   0.0572
 Prob.  0.0064   0.0009   0.8110
Panel B: firm month average abnormal returns
ABRET <= 0          
Frequency 1,221 2,060 3,281 723 1,398 2,121 498 662 1,160 
Percent 20% 32% 52% 18% 34% 52% 23% 31% 54% 
ABRET > 0          
Frequency 1,210 1,784 2,994 750 1,237 1,987 460 547 1,007 
Percent 19% 29% 48% 18% 30% 48% 21% 25% 46% 
TOTALS          
Frequency 2,431 3,844 6,275 1,473 2,635 4,108 958 1,209 2,167 
Percent 39% 61% 100% 36% 64% 100% 44% 56% 100%
          
Chi-square: Value  6.7542   5.9675   1.6518
 Prob.  0.0094   0.0146   0.1987
Early = early adopters (prior to 1998); late = late adopters (after 1997). 
Manufacturing = firms with SIC codes 2000-3999; non-manufacturing = all other firms. 
ABRET = monthly abnormal returns computed as follows: 
ABRETit = Rit – BRit,          
where Rit is the return for firm i in period t, BRit is the benchmark return for firm i in period t, and ABRETit is the abnormal return for 
firm i in period t. 
Panel A is based on averages of monthly abnormal returns for each firm (n = 137); panel B is based on the monthly abnormal 
returns for all firms with at least 24 up to 48 months (n = 6,275 or average of 45.8 months per firm). 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the average abnormal returns in our sample. Panel A shows the 
raw data as extracted from CRSP. Panel B shows the results after winsorizing the values at the 1 percent 
and 99 percent levels to control for the effects of outliers. Winsorizing is a statistical technique used to 
reduce the effect of spurious outliers by setting all outliers to a specific percentile of the data. It is 
commonly used in capital markets archival research where data often contain extreme outliers that would 
otherwise distort the measure of central tendency. Researchers use it as an alternative to trimming 
outliers, which minimizes the loss of observations (Barnett & Lewis, 1978; Hastings, Mosteller, Tukey, & 
Winsor, 1947). We winsorized our sample for each implementation decision year’s observations by setting 
all values less than the first percentile equal to the first percentile and all values greater than the 99th 
percentile equal to the 99th percentile. We extract monthly return data for each firm for the four years prior 
to ERP implementation decision. As we discuss above, we excluded any firm that did not have at least 24 
months of data. The final sample had 6,275 firm-months of data for the 137 firms, which averages to 45.8 
months each. We believe this amount of data is sufficient to establish the values and changes in value for 
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each firm. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for market capitalization for our sample. Panel A shows 
the raw data extracted from CRSP. Panel B shows data for the natural log of the market capitalization 
level, which is the variable we used to control for size in the regression analysis. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Returns
Panel A: abnormal returns raw 
 Firms Mos Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
1994 3 119 0.0160 0.0069 0.0808 -0.1929 0.2795 
1995 7 329 0.0120 0.0070 0.0839 -0.2558 0.3090 
1996 14 617 0.0083 -0.0012 0.1128 -0.4943 0.5421 
1997 9 408 0.0043 -0.0019 0.1167 -0.4730 0.5800 
1998 29 1370 -0.0053 -0.0050 0.1175 -0.5946 0.8463 
1999 12 576 0.0000 -0.0065 0.1037 -0.3611 0.4124 
2000 9 401 0.0019 -0.0045 0.1559 -0.5109 1.3591 
2001 6 288 -0.0026 -0.0179 0.1524 -0.5591 0.5711 
Manufacturing 89 4108 0.0013 -0.0035 0.1189 -0.5946 1.3591
1994 1 36 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0630 -0.1832 0.1007 
1996 6 250 0.0019 -0.0080 0.1091 -0.2912 0.6814 
1997 15 672 0.0071 -0.0025 0.1215 -0.6874 0.7347 
1998 15 715 -0.0024 -0.0088 0.1109 -0.5549 0.8463 
1999 2 74 -0.0193 -0.0191 0.1032 -0.5006 0.2941 
2000 8 372 0.0197 -0.0206 0.1924 -0.3903 1.2277 
2001 1 48 -0.0016 -0.0097 0.1106 -0.2066 0.3814 
Non-manufacturing 48 2167 0.0043 -0.0078 0.1308 -0.6874 1.2277
All firms 137 6275 0.0023 -0.0046 0.1231 -0.6874 1.3591
Panel B: abnormal returns winsorized at 1% and 99% levels
ABRETW Firms Mos Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
1994 3 119 0.0158 0.0069 0.0797 -0.1832 0.2470 
1995 7 329 0.0121 0.0070 0.0830 -0.2013 0.2836 
1996 14 617 0.0086 -0.0012 0.1070 -0.2388 0.3701 
1997 9 408 0.0050 -0.0019 0.1110 -0.2978 0.4052 
1998 29 1370 -0.0060 -0.0050 0.1061 -0.3603 0.3447 
1999 12 576 -0.0002 -0.0065 0.1020 -0.2670 0.3321 
2000 9 401 0.0003 -0.0045 0.1410 -0.3209 0.5603 
2001 6 288 -0.0015 -0.0179 0.1481 -0.3604 0.5376 
Manufacturing 89 4108 0.0011 -0.0035 0.1113 -0.3604 0.5603
1994 1 36 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0630 -0.1832 0.1007 
1996 6 250 0.0002 -0.0080 0.0990 -0.2388 0.3701 
1997 15 672 0.0062 -0.0025 0.1090 -0.2978 0.4052 
1998 15 715 -0.0031 -0.0088 0.1031 -0.3603 0.3447 
1999 2 74 -0.0161 -0.0191 0.0911 -0.2670 0.2941 
2000 8 372 0.0155 -0.0206 0.1722 -0.3209 0.5603 
2001 1 48 -0.0016 -0.0097 0.1106 -0.2066 0.3814 
Non-manufacturing 48 2167 0.0030 -0.0078 0.1186 -0.3603 0.5603
All firms 137 6275 0.0018 -0.0046 0.1138 -0.3604 0.5603
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Market Capitalization
Panel A: abnormal returns raw 
 Firms Mos Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
1994 3 119 4,502,267 4,516,073 1,503,679 849,151 9,303,931 
1995 7 329 5,071,005 1,316,058 9,247,606 89,781 32,017,268 
1996 14 617 2,744,943 1,367,994 5,272,929 28,423 37,442,732 
1997 9 408 1,509,478 448,420 1,704,580 57,852 7,425,972 
1998 29 1370 2,364,702 649,234 4,280,901 4,763 27,028,254 
1999 12 576 4,420,784 732,782 10,743,250 84,060 54,568,561 
2000 9 401 8,783,643 539,790 25,392,571 4,298 139,522,720 
2001 6 288 1,399,060 657,732 1,580,114 30,932 5,393,163 
Manufacturing 89 4108 3,462,709 824,519 10,044,020 4,298 139,522,720
1994 1 36 10,335,622 10,550,273 1,100,137 8,085,616 11,950,419 
1996 6 250 8,970,965 2,883,096 12,214,064 17,338 44,556,520 
1997 15 672 2,285,454 1,281,348 2,516,295 12,768 13,906,967 
1998 15 715 6,094,041 438,218 12,604,753 7,270 68,069,031 
1999 2 74 226,395 302,709 122,581 45,679 347,059 
2000 8 372 1,981,821 276,381 4,726,491 10,088 40,256,869 
2001 1 48 55,209 54,142 10,301 35,623 74,998 
Non-manufacturing 48 2167 4,275,278 555,810 9,092,020 7,270 68,069,031
All Firms 137 6275 3,743,321 748,367 9,732,741 4,298 139,522,720
Panel B: abnormal returns winsorized at 1% and 99% levels
ABRETW Firms Mos Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
1994 3 119 15.2486 15.3232 0.4211 13.6520 16.0459 
1995 7 329 14.1688 14.0902 1.5457 11.4051 17.2818 
1996 14 617 13.8549 14.1289 1.4607 10.2550 17.4383 
1997 9 408 13.5078 13.0135 1.2491 10.9656 15.8205 
1998 29 1370 13.3750 13.3835 1.7476 8.4687 17.1124 
1999 12 576 13.8357 13.5046 1.4907 11.3393 17.8150 
2000 9 401 13.4537 13.1989 2.2028 8.3658 18.7537 
2001 6 288 13.2261 13.3962 1.5319 10.3395 15.5006 
Manufacturing 89 4108 13.6400 13.6223 1.6693 8.3658 18.7537
1994 1 36 16.1454 16.1717 0.1099 15.9056 16.2963 
1996 6 250 14.0203 14.8744 2.6537 9.7606 17.6123 
1997 15 672 13.7318 14.0634 1.6225 9.4547 16.4479 
1998 15 715 13.4480 12.9905 2.2546 8.8915 18.0360 
1999 2 74 12.0857 12.6205 0.7928 10.7294 12.7572 
2000 8 372 12.4136 12.5295 2.2121 9.2191 17.5108 
2001 1 48 10.9012 10.8994 0.1924 10.4807 11.2252 
Non-manufacturing 48 2167 13.3663 13.2282 2.1746 8.8915 18.0360
All firms 137 6275 13.5455 13.5256 1.8638 8.3658 18.7537
 
Figure 2 graphically represents the mean abnormal returns from the winsorized values from panel B in 
Table 5. Notice that most of the early-stage adopters showed positive abnormal returns, which indicates 
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that their average returns for the four years leading up to the ERP implementation decision were above 
the benchmark of all firms in the CRSP database. By contrast, the average returns for the late-stage 
adopters were mixed with most less than zero, which indicates they performed below the benchmark. One 
can also see that manufacturing firms influenced the overall results because they were above zero in all 
four of the early-stage adopter years and near or below zero in all four of the late-stage adopter years. 
 
Figure 2. Average Abnormal Returns by Implementation Decision Year 
Table 7 provides results of the OLS regression analysis. The results confirm that the differences in the 
graph were significant. For the overall sample, the variable of interest (LATE) was negative and significant 
at the p = 0.05 level (-.0070, p<.05), which indicates that late-stage adopters had significantly lower 
abnormal returns than the early-stage adopters. The results for the manufacturing firms were even more 
significant with a negative coefficient significant at the p = 0.01 level (-.0107, p<.01). Results for the non-
manufacturing sample were not significant, which indicates that the average abnormal returns for the late-
stage adopters over the four years prior to their ERP implementation decision were not significantly 
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Table 7. OLS Regression Results
 All firms Manufacturing firms Non-manufacturing
Variable Estimate t-Value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Intercept -0.0283 -2.55** -0.0376 -2.53** -0.0229 -1.30 
LATE -0.0072 -2.42** -0.0107 -2.93*** -0.0007 -0.13 
MCAP 0.0026 3.27*** 0.0033 3.19*** 0.0019 1.59 
N 6275  4108  2167  
F-value 9.81  10.84  1.39  
Pr > F <.0001  <.0001  0.2495  
*** Indicates p-values <0.01; ** Indicates p-values <0.05 
 
Regression based on the following model: 
  ABRETit =  + 1Lateit + 2MCapit +   
where ABRETit is the abnormal return for firm i in period t. Lateit is a dichotomously coded variable equal to (1 for late-stage adopter 
firms and 0 for early-stage adopters, MCapit is the natural log of the market capitalization for firm i in period t, and  is the 
error term. 
Table 8 summarizes the results of our OLS regression that incorporates post-ERP implementation data. 
The variable of interest in this regression is “LATE*POST”, which is the interaction term. In the overall 
sample, the coefficient of .0163 was positive and significant at the p = 0.01 level, which indicates that late-
stage adopter abnormal returns improved relative to early-stage adopters. Similar results for the 
manufacturing firms (0.016; p<0.001) are consistent with our earlier findings that these firms drove the 
results. However, in this case, the non-manufacturing firms also showed positive significant results 
(0.0171; p<0.05), which indicates that they also experienced more improvement relative to early-stage 
adopters.  
Table 8. OLS Regression Results
 All firms Manufacturing firms Non-manufacturing
Variable Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Intercept -0.0335 -3.89*** -0.0410 -3.55*** -0.0257 -1.96* 
LATE -0.0073 -2.17** -0.0099 -2.41** -0.0028 -0.49 
POST -0.0081 -2.21** -0.0077 -1.61* -0.0094 -1.55 
LATE*POST 0.0163 3.47*** 0.0162 2.80*** 0.0171 2.10** 
MCAP 0.0030 5.12*** 0.0037 4.67*** 0.0022 2.48** 
N 12,263  8,174  4,089  
F-Value 9.78  8.05  2.92  
Pr > F <.0001  <.0001  0.0199  
Adjusted R-square .0029  .0034  .0019  
*** Indicates p-values <0.01; ** Indicates p-values <0.05; * Indicates p-values <0.10 
 
Regression based on the following model: 
  ABRETit = + 1Lateit + 2Postit + 3Late*Postit + 4MCapit +   
where ABRETit is the abnormal return for firm i in period t; Lateit is a dichotomously coded variable equal to (1 for late-stage adopter 
firms and 0 for early-stage adopters; Postit is a dichotomously coded variable equal to (1 for post-ERP implementation and 0 for pre-
ERP implementation; Late*Postit is a variable based on Late x Post; MCapit is the natural log of the market capitalization for firm i in 
period t, and  is the error term. 
5 Discussion of Results and Conclusion 
The results show that late-stage adopters experienced lower financial performance leading up to the time 
of their adoption as measured by abnormal returns compared to early-stage adopters. This finding 
provides empirical evidence to support the argument that early-stage adopters of technologies do so in an 
effort to gain or maintain competitive advantage through innovation, whereas late-stage adopters tend to 
be under-performers who are susceptible to institutional pressures. The results also show that 
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interconnectedness amplifies institutional pressures, which the strength of the relationship between the 
stage of adoption and firm performance among manufacturing firms evidences. The exchange of 
information between related organizations in a common industry such as manufacturing results in more 
opportunities to mimic and more pressure to adopt industry norms and best practices. 
Perhaps a more interesting result from our study is that it provides evidence that late-stage adopters may 
benefit more from ERP systems than early-stage adopters. As we discuss above, competing arguments 
for why such a finding makes sense exist. Perhaps it is as simple as noting that late-stage adopters, which 
we show were under-performers, have more room to improve and, therefore, to benefit from the features 
of ERP systems more than the early-stage adopters that we show were better performers prior to 
implementation. Or perhaps the incremental benefits of ERP adoption may tend to slow or become 
stagnant at some point after adoption, which allows later adopters to have comparatively larger benefits 
from ERP in their initial transition, reducing the difference in financial performance. Regardless, engaging 
in an institutional game of “follow the leader” has produced economic benefits for underperforming firms 
and helped them make progress towards catching up to other firms—useful information for ERP suppliers 
and consultants who may find that an effective way to market ERP systems could be to encourage 
mimicry by highlighting how firms have benefited from following successful early adopters.  
Our study has limitations that one should consider when generalizing the results. First, we arrive at our 
conclusions through deductive reasoning, and we did not specifically study individual firms’ decision 
making processes. For instance, we suggest that that Y2K may have provided coercive pressure on firms 
to adopt ERP and that underperforming firms are particularly susceptible to those pressures. However, 
one could argue that some early adopters may have moved toward ERP and toward dealing with risks 
associated with Y2K sooner because they had the financial strength to do so, while other organizations 
may have waited either for a stronger financial position or to learn more about the actual risk associated 
with Y2K. However, by coupling our findings with the existing literature, we find it reasonable to conclude 
that institutional pressures do indeed influence technology adoption decisions consistent with Teo et al. 
(2003) and Ugrin (2009) and that institutional pressures are stronger on those firms in later stages that are 
underperforming. Further, we cannot parcel out which institutional factors influenced the adoption 
decisions of the firms in our sample with certainty. We still do not know if our firms mimicked early 
adopters, went along with industry norms, or faced coercion. For instance, some firms may have adopted 
to mitigate potential Y2K problems, yet we cannot tell which firms those were. Perhaps future studies can 
find effective ways to evaluate that dilemma.  
Our paper has other limitations that future research could explore as well. We cannot parcel out the 
effects of positive and negative news about ERP adoption on late-stage adopters. There have been many 
high-profile ERP implementation failures, and it would be interesting to know how negative news of those 
failures affected adoption decisions. We do not know how failed adoption attempts influence future 
adoption decisions and implementations. For instance, one company in our late-adopter sample, Hershey, 
made an initial adoption attempt in 1998-1999 but failed to do so. They subsequently had a successful 
implementation. It would be interesting to examine how firms learn from their own past experiences and 
not just observing others. We also do not test any other conditions that may accentuate or impede the 
effects of institutional pressures beyond performance; future research should consider testing ways to 
mitigate these effects and examine the characteristics of the firms in our sample, their managers, and the 
interaction between those characteristics, performance, and adoption. Finally, our sample comprises only 
a small number of publically traded firms with an emphasis on manufacturing. It would be interesting to 
test the relationships in other industries, with other technologies, and among firms of different sizes.  
In conclusion, this study provides empirical evidence of the differing effects of firm performance on ERP 
adoption decisions and shows that less-successful firms can achieve economic benefits by following the 
actions of successful firms. The results fill a void left by limitations in other research, and, although we 
performed the study in the context of ERP adoption and implementation, the results should be relevant in 
many contexts and with many emerging technologies. 
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